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ABSTRACT: What becomes of our clearest theories of explanation, when faced with 
the unpalatable quantum phenomena that seem to undermine the direct conceptual 
connection between the fundamental material entities and the self-standing material 
objects of everyday parlance? The general explanatory theory advocates unification 
of explanatory concepts with everyday discourse, identification of essentially simi-
lar characteristics between direct experience and the hypothesised explanatory on-
tology, and a conceptualisation of phenomena in terms of objects enduring causally 
regulated change. On the other hand quantum theory feeds anti-realist suspicions 
about the worth of (metaphysical) realist explanatory endeavour with examples of 
phenomena in which the structure of material separation and individuation based on 
spatial extension is insufficient for construction of deeper explanatory narratives. 
An example from history of science, that of Newton’s law-constitutive definition 
of objects in response to Descartes problem of bodies is used to suggest a possible 
strategy for explanations unifying the quantum and common-sense conceptual do-
mains, provided the anti-realist challenge to such enterprise is read as questioning 
the epistemological justification of interpretation of experience in both cases. 
KEY WORDS: Conceptual framework, explanation, material objects, natural laws, 
quantum theory, realism.
It was once a rationalist’s expectation (and defiance in the face of dogma-
tism) that it is possible to…
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arrive at knowledge highly useful in life; and in room of the speculative 
philosophy usually taught in the schools, to discover a practical [one], by 
means of which, knowing the force and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the 
heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know 
the various crafts of our artisans, we might also apply them in the same way 
to all the uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the lords 
and possessors of nature. (R. Descartes, A Discourse on Method (Part VI). 
1637. This translation: Project Gutenberg ebook #59)
Experience of Law-Abiding Generalised Things:  
A Precarious Situation to be in
Suppose we want to provide a simple realist (in a metaphysical or sci-
entific, not purely semantic sense) strategy for offering an explanatorily 
superior alternative to anti-realist scepticism concerning metaphysical 
propositions of the fundamental physics. Such a strategy might rely on the 
causal-mechanical model of explanation whose fundamental ontological 
elements are the spatially located particles, the local extended and existing 
objects of varying scale. Thus the experience of the macroscopic objects is 
connected to the fundamental ontology through shared essential character-
istic of finite spatial extension and propagation of observable interaction 
across spatial separation.1 The individuality and identity of the basic par-
ticulars of this ontology is expected to conform to the same metaphysical 
principles as that of the directly observable objects that provide the con-
ceptual foundation of the common-sense conceptual framework, along the 
lines of descriptive metaphysics charted by Strawson (1959).
Though the macroscopic objects are no longer the physically fun-
damental elements of the ontology, they are in the final step reduced to 
the hypothesised fundamental entities, not directly observable, but essen-
tially similar to them: the irreducibly extended objects characterised by 
respect for objective spatial relations. Though naive and lacking in techni-
cal precision, such a “story” presents a foundation for a unified conceptual 
framework within which to construct causal mechanical explanations of 
the observed phenomena. A much more refined form of such an attempt 
at ontological and explanatory (essentially epistemological) unification or 
generalisation can be found in philosophical positions such as critical re-
alism (cf. Bhaskar, 2010 for a summary overview), though here we shall 
limit the scope to a simple strategy outlined above. In the “ontological 
1 It is important to stress that this is a deliberately simplified account, one which 
neglects other potentially fundamental characteristics, so as to paint a clearer contrast be-
tween the explanatory strategy and the problems induced by phenomena in the domain of 
quantum theory. We hold that this simplification does not detract from the truth-likeness of 
the problem and proposed solutions. 
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stables” of contemporary physics, as in everyday life, there are extended 
and spatially located things outside the perceiving observer, existing in-
dependently from being observed and entering into complex situations 
which can be understood (and manipulated) as interactions arising from 
intrinsic properties and endurance through spatial locations.
In the case of quantum theory, we follow Maudlin’s (2007a) sugges-
tion that the conceptual connection between the contemporary physical 
theories and common-sense must have at least some extended and local 
objects, the “local beables”.2 This is not to say that it can’t postulate any 
non-local such beable, but merely that for the connection to be established 
in the most straightforward way it must contain at least some. “We take the 
world to contain localized objects (of unknown composition) in a certain 
disposition that changes through time. These are the sorts of beliefs we 
begin with” (Maudlin 2007a: 3160). In principle a theory without local 
beables could also account for these beliefs, but the construction of expla-
nation from such a theory would prove a much harder task and one ridden 
with many more frailties, claims Maudlin. And the role of “local beables” 
is similar to that required of the material structure described essentially 
in terms of primary qualities, for they allow for a most direct connection 
between the experience of phenomena and the ontology that explanatorily 
accounts for them by providing a most commonly agreeable vocabulary, 
a conceptual framework, through which to account for that connection 
(Maudlin 2007a: 3160). The formal-quantum-theory response to such a 
framework is a version of Bohmian mechanics with local particles and the 
universal non-material law-like wavefunction3 (cf. Goldstein and Teufel 
2 This is a terminology introduced in Bell (1987), where a “beable” is a speculative 
piece of ontology, something that a theory postulates as being physically real. It is the 
foundational stone of our constructive approaches, the very construct that the explanation 
along the causal-mechanical lines rests on. Beables are the physical ontology that a theory 
postulates to exist. (These will be further explicated in the forthcoming sections.) “Local 
beables”, on the other hand, “do not merely exist: they exist somewhere” (Maudlin 2007a: 
3157). If local beables are all there is to physical ontology, then we get a Humean Mosaic, 
a global state of affairs constructed linearly out of a combination of local states, a simple 
summation of all local beables. Whether this can be done in quantum theory is the conten-
tious issue to be discussed in the thesis. 
3 Though aiming to be a general philosophical text, this article is occasionally littered 
with seemingly technical concepts from quantum theory or physics in general. We endeav-
our to discuss their significance for the position expounded here, but for reasons of brevity 
refrain from describing or presenting each of these in their own right, relying on the widely 
available internet resources and encyclopaedias to fill any such gaps in introductory descrip-
tion. All of the technical terms are well-presented in resources such as Wikipedia. Also for 
reasons of brevity and technical-clutter-free flow of the text, a deliberate (but in this context 
permissible and used in referenced texts) sloppiness in freely shifting between “wavefunc-
tion” and “Schrodinger equation” will be employed. It is the equation which more properly 
has the form of the law, whilst the wavefunction is but its essential component. 
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2004), or more precisely the equation specifying the evolution of variables 
in the wavefunction.
To discourage anti-realist criticism that quantum explanatory dis-
course concerning material microstructure relies on ontological vague-
ness that undermines the potential for generalised explanatory conceptual 
unification (cf. “at a certain limit we may have to fall back on stipulation 
or vagueness [in discourse about reality]”; Pettit 1991: 621) we have to 
show the possibility and explanatory utility of the conceptual connection 
from the basic structures of the common-sense conceptual framework to 
the fundamental ontology of all phenomena experienced in an interaction 
with the material world. This can be achieved by following a simple strat-
egy of settling on a minimal set of “typings of objects” (Devitt 1997) that 
are not dependent on human conceptualisation to explain the experiences 
they produce.4 Such a conceptualisation is a footing of explanatory strat-
egy, such as is lacking in the all-encompassing anti-realist criticism of ex-
planatory discourse, which does not allow any realist background against 
which details of competing explanations can be checked. But some physi-
cal phenomena from the domain of quantum theory pose problems for this 
strategy of creating a conceptual connection for they seem to provide an 
experiential basis for the denial of the realist-style validity of the elements 
of the common-sense conceptual scheme that we take as the starting point. 
The worry is then that quantum theory can be drawn upon as an example 
from science itself, and no less than a metaphysically fundamental seg-
ment of scientific practice, for the conceptual vagueness of even that fun-
damental aspect of the conceptual framework.
It is of course also said that such claims at conceptual unification of 
quantum theory with the supposed common-sense conceptual framework 
are nothing but a forcing of a new empirical theory (quantum mechanics) 
into the shackles of the old (classical mechanics) (Johansson 1992: 143). 
An example is given of the revolutionary shift from treating inertial mo-
tion of macroscopic bodies as an “unnatural or forced state” in Aristote-
lian physics into treating it as “as natural a state as rest is” in physics of 
Galileo and Newton. And yet, even Johansson admits that quantum theory 
cannot stand in an epistemological vacuum but must be combined into 
the complete knowledge of the universe, which has internal conceptual 
structure, elements of which appear necessary (1992: 145). But when it 
collides with those necessary structures, when it endangers the very poten-
4 Or more precisely, their characterisation as successful explanatory conceptualisa-
tions is not dependent solely on individual or enclosed community’s choice of conceptuali-
sation, and the typings exhibit enduringly successful explanatory role through increasingly 
manipulative interaction with the external environment. 
71M. DOMAZET: A Law-Constitutive Explanation
tial of our (admittedly highly simplified) strategy for unifying explanatory 
discourse, then we have to reconsider answering the sceptic.
Supposedly quantum theory presents the most clear example of the 
conceptual vagueness lodged in the fundamental aspect of the conceptual 
framework in individuality and temporal identity of objects, given by the 
constrictions of extension taken as primitive and isomorphic in both the 
fundamental ontology and the objects of common sense experience, in-
cluding the role of spatial separation in the conceptualisation of individu-
ality. So as not to block a possibility of a unified explanatory conceptual 
framework of the everyday experience and the problematic quantum phe-
nomena in terms of fundamental ontology we suggest adding further non-
separable elements to the fundamental ontology. Yet that very element, 
the universal non-separable law seems to play a role more important than 
a mere non-separability patch. It is outright characterised by ontological 
holism and potentially more important for the desired explanation than 
the extended material ontology taken to be the fundamental connector be-
tween the directly observable and the hypothesised in the phenomena.
Healey (2009) defines ontological holism as a metaphysical situation 
in which “some objects are not wholly composed of basic physical parts”. 
This is not to say that they are composed of non-physical parts in addition 
to physical, at least that is not the intention in analyses of quantum theory 
of this kind (Healey 2009), but rather that when we desire to take some 
physical entities as “wholly composed of particular set of basic physical 
parts” quantum theory precludes us from doing so. And though Healey 
purports that most types of metaphysical holism encouraged in physics 
are of the property holism kind, i.e. they require that some objects have 
properties that are not determined by physical properties of their basic 
physical kinds, for our purposes of seeking explanatory conceptualisation 
in terms of those properties which enable wider explanatory unification 
this generalises into an ontological holism (as presented above). This is 
because the properties of concern for us here are also taken to be the iden-
tity conferring properties (in the Strawsonian (1959) sense) for the basic 
elements of ontology. 
In fact in his subsequent presentation of ontological holism in quan-
tum theory Healey (2009) says as much, with reference to views of Bohr, 
Bohm and others. With reference to Bohm’s (1952) introduction of the 
field associated with the wavefunction (part of the quantum formalism 
alongside codification of the selected property-states of particles) that 
guides the particles’ trajectories. Healey concludes that coupled with the 
ontological assumption that the basic physical parts of the universe are 
not just the particles it contains, as is proposed by our explanatory uni-
fication strategy, Bohm’s interpretation and its descendants (as the one 
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advocated here) establish an ontological holism. Of course, Healey imme-
diately notes, there are alternative views of the ontology of Bohm’s theory 
that are not forced to follow that line, or are constructed specifically so 
as to exclude it. Further and more forceful routes to ontological holism, 
and additional coupling with the explanatory unification views presented 
here, are given by connecting the failure of a principle of separability to 
ontological holism via, among other technical details omitted here,5 Ein-
stein’s concept of individuation of physical systems by spatial separation. 
Of course, as Healy notes (following Dickson 1998), theories with such 
reliance on ontological holism present a highly unsatisfactory explanatory 
doctrine.
Briefly, violations of separability threaten to knock-down the whole 
“house of cards” defence from anti-realist explanatory scepticism as given 
above by denying the sensibility of the foundations of the common-sense 
conceptual scheme. According to Einstein’s staunch conceptualisation of 
physical reality,6 the idea of physical things existing and arranged into “a 
space-time continuum” (Einstein 1948: 321) requires that they can “claim 
an existence independent of one another, insofar as these things ‘lie in dif-
ferent parts of space’” (Einstein 1948: 321). In other words these objects 
arranged in space, as required by the core elements of our foundational 
conceptual scheme, ought to have an intrinsic individuality (an “itness”),7 
i.e. whether they are interacting or not they should have separate intrinsic 
states (Howard 1994). The states can change as a result of interactions, but 
those interactions can be accounted for again in terms of the local changes 
in the adjacent regions of the space-time continuum and, provided that the 
interaction is epistemically accessible in the given small region of space 
the object occupies, it is always to be separately definable. Furthermore, 
all composite objects acquire all their properties from the constituents’ 
intrinsic states and locally intrinsic interactions.
Empirically confirmed predictions from quantum formalism (most 
notably: EPR and teleportation phenomena) seem to deny this property 
5 Namely through the violation of Bell inequalities, cf. Bell (1964); (1987) or Shi-
mony (2009). 
6 Bell (as quoted in Johansson 1992) himself feels that quantum theory’s empirically 
confirmed violations of his inequality constraints have “Nature” proving Einstein wrong, 
despite Bell’s expressed admiration for Einstein’s scientific rationality and the conceptu-
alization of reality that he endorses. 
7 This should not be confounded with the notion of primitive thisness and identity as 
championed most notably in the works of R. M Adams. It allocates a foundational identity, 
for want of a better term an “itness” (as suggested by D. Lehmkuhl in private correspond-
ence), to the elements of reality but not one they retain independent of their potential for 
interaction with other elements of reality. 
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to the objects in the domain of the theory: the supposed constituents of 
everyday macroscopic objects. This means that either quantum theory is 
not a fundamental physical theory and is not concerned with fundamental 
scientific explanatory ontology (a position Einstein advocated), or that we 
have to find some way of explaining how such separability violations are 
either benign (to our fundamental conceptual scheme) or just an illusion 
that does not actually affect the fundamental common sense explanatory 
conceptualization based on the notion of primary qualities. We have to 
bear in mind that at least for some properties (and the crucial question is 
whether for those we are most interested in: the traditional primary quali-
ties) separability is a conceptual prerequisite for this definite object to be 
said to possess this definite property (Howard 1994), and also to account 
for the changes of that property through the processes that foundation-
ally rely on the primacy of extension in material world. Most notably, the 
depth of explanation accounts require a conceptual reconstruction of the 
phenomena in terms of manipulation of definite object properties. Can 
we reconstruct explanatory accounts in situations where those properties 
presuppose adherence to separability to conceptualize the objects in the 
first place? The problem for unificatory potential is even greater if the mi-
croscopic “objects” are fundamental material constituents of the everyday 
macroscopic ones.
The lessons of the search for deeper explanations8 (Hitchcock and 
Woodward 2003; Psillos 2007) coupled with the regulated limitations (i.e. 
not permitting haphazard unbridled information transmission)9 of the sep-
arability violations inherent in quantum theory (cf. Brown and Timpson 
2006) suggest a deep explanation that can still respect the realist strat-
egy of explanatory unification is concerned with the structural constraints 
which endure despite not being directly epistemically accessible. That is, 
in the formal quantum presentation the phenomenon is not given by the 
bare fact of the appearance of the correlations between the macroscopic 
outcomes of distant measurements, it is given by the whole account of the 
experimenters’ production of the correlations with manipulations of mac-
 8 For reasons of brevity there is no space here to properly present and summarise the 
discussions concerning depth of explanation, but we must note that depth of explanation is 
what is valued even in our simple strategy, deeper explanations win the game. 
9 We cannot enter into a broader discussion of these regulated violations, but the 
point here is that though violations of separability occur, they occur (and are predicted by 
the theory to occur) in such a way as to preclude epistemic access to signals, causal influ-
ences or exact unequivocal deterministic predictions prior to local measurement taking 
place. Brown and Timpson’s (2006) discussion referred to above presents a powerful case 
as to why physics is epistemologically  (if not metaphysically) safe from the separability 
violations inferred from quantum theory. 
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roscopic equipment as objects in space and time.10 This requires that the 
initial conceptualisation of objects contains not just their essential struc-
ture (in our simple case, the geometrical structure of spatial extension, cf. 
Harre, 1996 and a summary below) but respects a wider framework of the 
interactions and changes those objects can endure (and still be re-identi-
fied as the same objects)11 and the effects we as human agents (and not 
pure observers) can have on them.
This is asking for a slightly more complex starting point (the com-
mon-sense conceptual framework) that is meant to be shared with the 
anti-realist critic. It is a further task then to illustrate that the additional el-
ements introduced in our solution were always there in the starting point, 
and have not now been added to save appearances. To that end we note 
that our experience of interaction with objects is as much as part of our 
everyday conceptual scheme as is the bare experience of perceiving those 
objects. If so much is admitted we can add to the essential requirements 
of isomorphism not just the durability of extended objects but also a no-
tion of regularities of the changes they undergo. The essential structure 
is given by the objects’ shape and the existent laws that it conforms to in 
the right circumstances. These laws are not observable to us in the same 
way as individual material entities, but are inferentially no less real than 
material structure, and cannot be reduced-away in terms of locally (i.e. not 
a total description) specifiable concurrence of events (though, this is how 
we at first come to speculate about their existence, to form the required 
metaphysical projections). We infer, and then empirically test, the effects 
of the potentially fundamental laws of temporal evolution (“FLOTEs” in 
terminology of Maudlin 2007b).
10 We must be careful though not to get entwined with Bohrian denial of the pos-
sibility of construction of causal metaphysics, here. This does not claim that every phe-
nomenon must necessarily include in its description the macroscopic situation and the 
experimenters’ intentions, but that an explanation of the phenomenon that can be unified 
with the common-sense conceptual scheme need not be constructed solely out of the mo-
mentary localized spatial situation of objects and forced between them. 
11 It might be objected that a Strawsonian programme of identifying particulars only 
requires that a thing be identified by a description and also be given one other independent 
description. There might be such “particulars” in quantum theory, without satisfying other 
constraints we have put on them here (namely to be spatially extended objects, most com-
monly particles). That is certainly true, but the other constrictions are employed here in an 
attempt to build a conceptually unified explanatory strategy, combined with Strawsonian 
programme, or its most common result of selecting macroscopic objects as basic particu-
lars of the “everyday” conceptual scheme, for added benefit but not a necessary condition. 
In any case, basic particulars passing the requirements of the Strawsonian (and apparently 
Quinean, too) programme only, would not provide the desired unificatory explanatory 
strategy along the lines of rebuttal of scepticism advocated here. 
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The advantage of such conceptual construct in Bohmian mechanics is 
that it allows for regulated separability violations, and subsequent denial 
of the fundamental metaphysical separability, whilst nonetheless avoid-
ing the threat of ultimate full and complete ontological holism. The latter 
would provide a non-starter for our defence from antirealist criticism, as 
it would show even the most basic conceptual framework to be a meta-
physical conceptual imposition and invite response-dependency (as in 
Pettit 1991) for all concepts of the said framework, and thus present seri-
ous, if not insurmountable, difficulties for explanatory conceptualisation 
(cf. Healey 2009). Yet the acceptance of the separability violation is not 
as threatening to the whole project of physics as Einstein (1971; cf. be-
low) suggested due to limits of knowability, enshrined in the no-signalling 
theorem, which assure us that even if we could know of the non-separable 
change of properties, the supervenient (general, but not necessarily fun-
damental) physical laws we can empirically deduce for our region would 
not have been different.
Our explanatory conceptualisation includes non-separable changes 
taking place, but they (due to no-signalling prohibition) do not crucially 
affect the limited predictions we can make about the behaviour of objects 
in the said region. They do not affect the possibility of performing manip-
ulative science from which to derive the truth-conditions for the relevant 
object manipulation on the extended material ontology in the local region. 
In other words, though our explanatory conceptual framework (in search 
of explanatory synthesis through retrodiction) must not contain total sepa-
rability, we can still do science; to the extent that we do in experimental 
and descriptive employment of the quantum formalism.
But some phenomena in quantum theory (and of course their experi-
mental “reification”) still present a problem for our general explanatory 
strategy. Even when coupled with the universal law that non-separably 
transmits their interactions, our fundamental ontological elements lose 
the guarantee of intrinsic individuality and identity over time. Phenomena 
like the Aharonov-Bohm effect and teleportation, suggest that reference 
to the non-separable element (the wavefunction understood either as the 
potential or as the law) is more important in constructing a unified ex-
planatory account than the enduring spatial existence of the particles (the 
objects or the beables). The latter can be affected, in a way that is not even 
objectively discernible (in the case of teleportation), so that they lose the 
characteristics required of the basic conceptual particulars and appear as 
metaphysical baggage added to the description of the situation for tradi-
tionally appealing connection to the everyday objects-in-space discourse. 
If the empirical access they provide to the independent reality through 
being parts of the directly observable macroscopic objects can be replaced 
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with some other explanatory conceptual construct, their very existence 
could be denied. But then the whole project of explanatory unification 
based on the irreducibly extended ontology loses its appeal. This is espe-
cially acute in the case of teleportation where not only empirical access, 
but the very enduring existence in a spatial location is denied and objects 
with different properties are instantaneously swapped without giving rise 
to locally and objectively detectable consequences (cf. Fuchs 2002).
The question that the teleportation, as the key “troublesome” phenom-
enon, raises is: given how much of the conceptual framework is relegated 
to the non-local beable, are the local beables conceptually strong enough 
to uphold our simple strategy for realist explanation? What kind of entities 
those particles (as basic physical objects, or beables) are, given that they 
require constant awareness of the stipulations of the law to provide them 
with individuality and temporal identity? Devoid of directly perceivable 
characteristics and more important in explanatory retrodiction than ma-
nipulative prediction, can they be fundamental entities at all? 
Alas, a Historical Precursor
Brading (forthcoming) presents an analysis of what might for us be a pre-
cursor from the history of science. She presents Newton’s solution to the 
“problem of bodies” that initially plagued Descartes’ potential to explain 
the mechanical phenomena. The problem is to say what the “bodies” to 
which the laws of motion apply are. Classical mechanics in the exposition 
of Descartes and Newton is a science of bodies in motion. Bodies are the 
metaphysical subject matter of this science, but it is epistemically unclear 
what these bodies are. This is especially acute for Descartes as he argues 
for the plenum of extended matter, a type of holism if no other empirically 
accessible characteristics of the plenum’s elements are available, whilst 
the laws of motion apply to (discrete, separable) bodies. The question be-
comes how we identify the required bodies out of the metaphysical sup-
position of the continuous material plenum. Descartes is thus required to 
explain in virtue of what the extended matter is divided into parts such that 
we can clearly and distinctly perceive and consequently conceptualise it 
as mechanics of bodies in motion. The solution that Descartes proposes 
is plagued by circularity, Brading suggests,12 in that the motion is defined 
in terms of bodies, whilst bodies are defined (conceptualised) as the divi-
sion of indefinite matter achieved through the relative motions (of the said 
divisions).
12 The problem of individuation of bodies has indeed been a constant theme of Carte-
sian studies, Alexandrescu (2009: 76). 
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In our contemporary case, it is the loss of separability in the fundamen-
tal ontology that leads to the loss of the fundamental position of the tradi-
tional primary qualities, and the parallels with Descartes’ case. It is on a tacit 
assumption of separability that we historically and conceptually build the 
half-scientific conceptual scheme of objects interacting along identifiable 
“lines” in space-time. Einstein stresses the importance of the assumption.
However, if one abandons the assumption that what exists in different parts 
of space has its own, independent, real existence, then I simply cannot see 
what it is that physics is meant to describe. For what is thought to be a sys-
tem is, after all, just a convention, and I cannot see how one could divide the 
world objectively in such a way that one could make statements about parts 
of it. (Einstein 1971: 164–165)
Yet the connection between the Cartesian plenum and the situation in quan-
tum theory is not obvious. There is no plenum whose segments need to be 
individuated into objects. But there is a notion of objects whose very meta-
physical individuation or even enduring existence is brought into question 
because of a metaphysical commitment to the violation of separability, and 
even instantaneous “location replacement” through the phenomenon of te-
leportation. If “change in general” is taken to replace “motion” it is easier to 
see the connection between the Cartesian and contemporary problems: we 
need a change defined in terms of enduring objects (both for the descrip-
tive metaphysics and as required by notion of deeper explanations) whilst 
the conceptualisation of bodies is insufficient on the spatial extension (ge-
ometrical structure) alone and includes the law-abiding change as part of 
the definition. The latter bodies (the particles, or beables) need to have the 
conceptual individuality of the same type as the macroscopic bodies that 
feature in direct experience of the world. They are in fact expected to be the 
building blocks of the macroscopic structure participating in the observed 
phenomena, the conceptual foundation stones of the isomorphic connection 
(Sellars 1963) between the microscopic and the macroscopic. Change is the 
rearrangement of the situation of the primary entities, and the primary enti-
ties are that which is re-identifiable through change, the enduring isomorphic 
connectors between the microscopic and the macroscopic. In the version of 
Bohmian Mechanics (or interpretation of quantum theory) sketched above 
the law seems to be an important part of the definition of an object.
Brading (forthcoming) aptly separates the historical problem into a 
metaphysical and epistemological dimension.13 Thus, at the level of meta-
13 Alexandrescu (2009) suggests that Descartes himself does exactly the opposite, at 
least at face value, by making epistemology required by explanation dependent on meta-
physics, effectively unifying them. That, however, is not the epistemology of his “practi-
cal” physics; which is something Brading (following Newton) requires. 
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physics the problem of bodies requires a determination of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for individuality of a body, searching for what makes 
something a body. There are different examples of attempts to answer this 
question from the history of philosophy (looking for metaphysical con-
ditions of distinctness, uniqueness of bundles of properties or essential 
properties and the like). Conditions of enduring identity over time are also 
required, we must specify in virtue of what an individual is the same in-
dividual at another time. On the epistemological side, though, we must 
answer to what guarantees our access to the individuation and identity 
features of the objects.
A partial solution to such analysis of the problem of bodies, Brading 
suggests, is offered by Newton who identifies the abidance of laws as the 
necessary condition for individuality and identity over time. To be a body 
is to necessarily satisfy the laws of motion (which are natural laws not 
empirical generalizations). Of course, Newton’s solution is partly aided by 
not having to overcome the epistemic conditions for the separation of bod-
ies out of an otherwise uniform plenum. Nonetheless, Brading argues, the 
Newtonian solution to the problem of bodies suggests a law-constitutive 
understanding of bodies: definition of bodies is incomplete prior to the 
specification of the laws of nature, and completed by those laws of nature. 
We must omit the details of Brading’s exposition here and focus on distill-
ing the useful parallels from the perspective of explanations between the 
classical macroscopic and the contemporary (quantum) microscopic case. 
Most notably, we have to overcome a problem that Brading herself points 
to, namely what the sufficiency conditions for something to be a body 
will be. Making the stated necessary condition also one of sufficiency 
leads to the same kind of circularity that plagues Descartes as suggested 
above. Brading says that the sufficiency condition remains an open prob-
lem for the classical case and calls for a further research programme. But 
for the purposes of the parallels to be drawn here we can view the calls 
for a sufficiency condition as the return of the dispositionalist challenge 
(or we might call it a general anti-realist sceptical challenge) that we must 
provide necessary and sufficient epistemic conditions for the object-iden-
tification to even begin to explain the perceived phenomena.
And the separation of the “problem of bodies” along with the law-
constitutive solution into a metaphysical and epistemological part might 
hint towards a possible solution to the problem of construction of expla-
nations in terms of the said bodies. Namely, it is important how we view 
the dispositionalist challenge in the explanation-construction case. If it 
is viewed as a form of metaphysical scepticism it most probably must be 
taken at face value and left without a solution, such an all-encompassing 
scepticism cannot be refuted. It immediately brings with it a scepticism 
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of the epistemological kind, of course.14 Or, in other words, were the said 
“scepticism” but an introduction to an alternative metaphysical frame-
work, no comparison between them is to be had, save for an, to use van 
Fraassen’s (1980) terminology, “an aesthetic preference in explanation”. 
But if the initial dispositional sceptical objection is of the epistemological 
kind, then it is not necessary to proceed immediately to the metaphysical 
(in this case ontological) scepticism. And if we take the dispositionalists 
as accepting that there is a structured reality restricting our experience, 
then their objections can be read as an epistemological scepticism, namely 
that we cannot know the conditions that justify the interpretation of expe-
rience as changes suffered by enduring bodies rather than along the lines 
of alternative structure.
But in line with Wittgensteinian tradition of avoidance of sceptical 
challenges (Wittgenstein 1967; Baker and Hacker 1984) we can refuse 
to accept the epistemological challenge.15 For the explanatory strategy 
can draw on the ontological commitment of the conceptual framework 
we share with the dispositionalist (or general anti-realist sceptic) as one 
of independently existing objects which can be identified and re-identi-
fied. As the existence of something in reality that fulfils the conceptual 
role of such re-identifiable objects is a pre-condition of the use of the 
conceptual scheme the scepticism is expressed in, it cannot be doubted in 
the same breath. To speak of the objects enduring changes through phe-
nomena is part and parcel of the conceptual scheme used to express doubt 
about the possibility of justification of existence of adequate structures in 
reality that the concepts of objects could refer to. Thus, Strawson (1959) 
claims that metaphysical scepticism along those lines is senseless. Even if 
we don’t take Strawson’s argument as conclusive in our specific case, we 
should take it as indicating that the dispositionalist challenge as expressed 
in the opening sections is one of epistemological kind: we can’t know that 
our interpretation of experience is justified, as we lack explicit necessity 
and sufficiency conditions. To accept the dispositionalist challenge is to 
accept that assenting to the conceptual commitments of the common sense 
conceptual framework involves an interpretation of experience in a certain 
14 In his own presentation of the historical case of Descartes’ individuation of bodies, 
Alexandrescu (2009) suggests that this is the gulf between Descartes on the one side and 
both Newton and Leibniz on the other. The latter simply had radically different metaphysi-
cal frameworks to Descartes’ so that no discussion was possible between them at all. 
15 This might be similar to the warning of “epistemic fallacy” in the philosophical po-
sition of critical realism, but a further investigation is required to delineate the (in)validity 
of that point. For our purposes it serves as a mere footnote illustration of potentially similar 
philosophical positions addressing the same issue (separation of metaphysical and episte-
mological challenges) from a different perspective, or as a rhetorical trick (in Aristotelian 
sense) of belabouring the main point. 
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way. But no such interpretation takes place, so no conditions of correct-
ness of interpretation need to be specified. We do not start with the bare 
experience in which we search for objects. Newton’s job was made that 
much easier by not starting with the plenum, neither epistemically nor 
metaphysically, whilst Descartes needs to account for the lack of the epis-
temic plenum (and the pragmatic use of the mechanics of bodies) whilst 
maintaining that it exists in the metaphysical sense.
In summary, the requirement for explication of the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for epistemic identification of the (unobservable) bodies 
at the level of microstructure, and the situation of empirical equivalence of 
mechanistic and non-mechanistic interpretations, suggests we are dealing 
with an epistemic scepticism that can be addressed in the way suggested 
above. Being an extended part of the macroscopic body is then the sug-
gested epistemic route to the identification of the microscopic body, whilst 
the identity over time is conceptually dependent on the proscriptions of the 
universal law as much as on the spatial location. What we accept, though, is 
that the experience, the starting point of the explanation, often the explanan-
dum itself, is not given in terms of the uninterpreted structure of the physi-
cal reality at some given instant, of the “Humean mosaic” (Lewis 1986) of 
instantaneous facts independent of the conceptual framework. Instead, it is 
recognised as posed in terms of generalized things (Harre 1996) accompa-
nied by some primitive awareness of space and time. Or in Ryle’s (1949) 
terms: to have an experience, a sensation, is not to be in a cognitive relation 
to a sensible object that is a wholesome atom of experience. For to talk 
about, or conceptualise, sense data is to already talk about common objects, 
to apply learned perception-recipes for the typification of appearances of 
common objects (cf. Devitt 1997) to whatever one is trying to make out at 
the moment. We simply have a series of sensible expectation properties ful-
filled, we implicitly know what to expect of objects, and can make a further 
metaphysical projection from that, without having to justify the supposed 
interpretative process that leads there from the bare sense data.
The suggestion then is to stop the anti-realists at the level of epistemo-
logical scepticism, without having to make the further step towards the on-
tological scepticism; we can accept that we needn’t name the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for individuality and temporal identity of objects to be 
used by our explanation-generating community, without having to imme-
diately assume that metaphysically such conditions cannot be found.16 We 
16 Interestingly this actually seems to be aligned with Descartes’ explanatory strategy 
and overall philosophy of physics (which admittedly does not place it on a historically 
victorious footing), according to Alexandrescu (2009). Descartes also insists that the meta-
physical conception should not be reached via the justification tools for the physical/ex-
periential. 
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can accept the bare community agreement as encoded in the conceptual 
scheme as the epistemological mechanism, and say that we never needed to 
provide an interpretation of experience that would single out objects, that 
objects were a part of having an experience in the first place as Ryle sug-
gests above. The unobservable microscopic objects are then an abstraction 
within the same conceptual framework, requiring only a modification not 
the abandonment of framework’s foundational component. This of course, 
does not rule out as impossible the metaphysical commitments of differ-
ent kind, such as generally grouped into Everett-type interpretations, but 
requires a different strategy of fending off anti-realist sceptical claims.
To avoid having to justify the conceptual framing of experience as 
interpretation of the bare sense data arising from conceptually radically 
different ontology, some of which is in-principle epistemically inacces-
sible, and thus to fend off the slide into excessive dispositionalism (where 
everything is reduced to the dispositions of the law, but those are unknow-
able; as in Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi 1992) we must employ the tried and 
tested technique of relying on the “geometrical” isomorphism between the 
common-sense conceptual scheme of re-identifiable objects and the fun-
damental ontology of spatially situated particles (the local beables). Yet to 
justify the existence of an external criterion of correctness of explanatory 
conceptualisations of this reduction of the empirically accessible to the 
empirically inaccessible, especially with respect to the classically “un-
expected” phenomena, we must postulate the existence of the non-local 
universal law that affects the metaphysical conditions of re-identification 
of the fundamental ontology. In that, as we struggle to conceptualise the 
details of a causal connections between separated elements of the funda-
mental ontology, we must make the universal law primitive and modify 
the starting conceptualisation of the empirically accessible in phenomena 
to include both the spatial extension of objects and their subscription to 
(unknown) law. But this is simply to explicitly recognise Ryle’s (1949) 
requirement to include in the concept of any object an expectation of ful-
filment of sensible experiences, in some cases explicitly as stated by the 
effective derivations of the universal law (and not immediately intuitive).
Alternatively, tackling the sceptical challenge head on (or accepting 
its metaphysical alternative as a necessary consequence), takes us back to 
Descartes’ circularity trap (from the Newtonian critical perspective, not 
necessarily the trap Descartes himself would have admitted, cf. Alexan-
drescu 2009) and makes us unable to account for the external constraints 
on our explanatory conceptualisation. The problematic phenomena in the 
quantum domain, those that require abandonment of the expectation of 
separability then expose the conceptualisation of the separate re-identifi-
able objects in space as just an illusion imposed by us onto the essen-
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tially holistic fundamental ontology of forever epistemically inaccessible 
world-stuff. Our typification, our carving of the world-stuff into managea-
ble concepts is just an illusion, and any such carving is as good as another: 
a game of freely constructing the facade before the noumenal world. But 
on such account all explanations are equally vacuous, as there is no matter 
of fact as to what explains what. The suggested price to pay to avoid this 
(in the absence of a satisfyingly primitive account of causation, and veri-
fiable causal account of construction of experience) is to view the world 
from the outset as characterised not just by momentary spatial relations, 
but also by the mind-independent (primitively characterised) nomological 
structure. This mysterious guiding-hand-behind-events requirement may 
be too much of a price to pay on some worldviews. Especially as the 
theory itself demands that the universal law behind quantum phenomena 
(and fundamentally behind most physical phenomena) remains in-princi-
ple epistemically inaccessible (Dürr, Goldstein & Zanghi 1992; Goldstein 
& Struyve 2007).
What this leaves us with is an explicit acceptance of a modification 
of the starting point conceptual scheme, of the Strawsonian account of 
basic particulars, but not a modification that is outright unacceptable. We 
start from arguing for the necessary minimal typification of experience 
into that of enduring objects. As we cannot take an absolutely preferen-
tial external position and certifiably view the world “as it is in itself”, it 
is prudent to start from a shared ground, that of the common conceptual 
framework. From here we rapidly proceed from accepting that we all have 
thoughts about material objects to “necessitation” of the commitment to 
the conceptual scheme that sees the objects as existing independently of 
us in an objective framework of space and time. This commitment can 
further be distinguished from a sensorily similar commitment that there 
appear to be objects existing independently of us by further investigation 
of how the notion of those objects participates in our objective accounts of 
the world, including the intersubjective communication.
As we investigate the nature of material reality in greater depth we 
come to uncover a number of unsubstantiated concepts inherent in the 
above conceptual scheme, which must be removed from the scheme of 
what is taken as ontologically basic. Many of the identifying properties 
of material objects are dispensed with, but the germ of structure immedi-
ately evident and independent of our judgment remains, that of the neces-
sary primary quality of extension in space. The identity of objects remains 
founded in the combination of identities of smaller objects that make them 
up, all related to each other through definite relations in space. Though 
our explanations no longer take the material objects as we perceive them 
as fundamental, they tell us how the appearance of the objects arises out 
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of their fundamental structure, and the typification that does not slip away 
along this route is the extended structure of objects as constructed out 
their constituents. When the structure is subject to change, the varieties of 
effective changes can be conceptually subsumed under adherence to laws 
of nature (e.g. Newtonian laws of motion). The germ of the connection 
between the Manifest and the Scientific images (Sellars 1963) is given 
in the shared nature of extension and the law-constitutive conceptualisa-
tion in both the account of fundamental physical ontology and the directly 
perceivable material objects. The methodological parallel with the New-
tonian (Brading, forthcoming) solution of Descartes’ problem of bodies 
in physics points to further research in this analogy of conceptualisation 
of reality, especially the pragmatic triumph of Newtonian over Cartesian 
scheme.
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